Routledge Handbook of Latin America in the World

A writer and publisher, Jorge Dominguez focuses on comparative politics and international affairs in Latin America, and how these countries relate to the rest of the world. Jorge I. Dominguez’s book Routledge Handbook of Latin America in the World provides readers with a guide on select Latin American countries’ political systems and their diplomatic relationships.

The Routledge Handbook of Latin America in the World does more than just explain the region’s political evolution in the 30 years proceeding its publication. In each section, it focuses on specific issues, social, economic, and diplomatic, impacting countries’ operations. Some examples include Argentina and Brazil’s domestic and global policy challenges, and the then-current state of countries’ relationships with specific external actors.

The Routledge Handbook of Latin America in the World contains essays written and or translated by several scholars in the field. Written to benefit academics, students, and researchers alike, the authors provide both theoretical and empirically-based insights. Edited by Dominguez and Ana Covarrubias, it was published in 2014.

Fulbright Program Scholarships Available in Guatemala

Retired professor Jorge I. Dominguez is an accomplished writer and publisher based in Center Harbor, New Hampshire. With a doctorate in political science, Jorge I. Dominguez previously served on the Board of Trustees of the Latin American Scholarship Program of American Universities, one of the Fulbright Programs available in Guatemala.

The Fulbright Program is a prestigious international educational exchange program. The program’s mission is to foster international relations between people of the United States and other countries. Established in 1946 by Arkansas Senator William Fulbright, the Fulbright Program offers up to 4,500 grants annually.

Fulbright Programs in Guatemala include the Fulbright Foreign Student Program, the Hubert H. Humphrey Program, the Teaching Excellence and Achievement Program, and the Latin American Scholarship Program of American Universities. All programs provide a range of opportunities to young professionals, artists, graduate students, secondary school teachers, and Guatemalan professors. The programs range from six weeks to the duration of a grantee’s study. Over 200,000 people have benefited from Fulbright programs.

Cuba’s Communist Party Leadership: 

Between Change and Rigidity, Reform and Repression 

Can Cuba’s ruling Communist Party undertake reforms? A reform agenda may start with a  slogan made popular elsewhere in Latin America (¡Que se vayan todos!) – out with everyone in  national leadership posts. In fact, the April 2021 Party Congress approximated that goal. All  members of the Party’s national Secretariat were replaced, as were half of the members of the  Political Bureau and half of the key provincial officials (the First Party Secretaries). Eleven of  the thirteen active-duty Generals serving on the Central Committee also departed, as did three  out of five of all Central Committee members. 

Leaving the Party’s Political Bureau were President Raúl Castro, former Interior Minister  Ramiro Valdés, and long-time Party Organization Secretary José Ramón Machado, among other  notables who had ruled for decades. More typical had been the outcome of the 2016 Party  Congress, when none such notables left, only one in ten of the “political” Generals was new to  the Central Committee, and the majority of the Secretariat held on. 

A reform agenda would also require greater leadership pluralism to prevent a small clique  from undertaking all decisions. This, too, has been happening. In 2016, about a quarter of the  ministers had also served on the Council of State, hence approving their own proposals. The  2019 Constitution brought to zero the overlap between the Council of Ministers and the Council  of State. The 2021 Party Congress also reduced the overlap between the two Councils, on the one  hand, and, on the other, the Party’s Political Bureau and Central Committee. 

In this century, greater demographic inclusion has been the rule as well, doubling the  proportion of Afrodescendants in Council of State posts and bringing their share and that of 

women on this Council closer to their respective shares of the population. The median age in  elite institutions has fallen; new Central Committee members must be below age sixty. So, why the unprecedented nationwide protests in July 2021 – thousands of people  protesting on the streets of three dozen cities across the provinces – and what was new in 2021? Cuba’s economic stagnation, in effect near zero growth for a decade, does not explain the July  protests. Nor do U.S. economic sanctions in place for decades, notwithstanding Trump  administration enhancements. Nor does the equally long authoritarian regime. Nor do the effects  of the Covid-19 pandemic. If so, the protests would have occurred well before. In 2021, much changed. The economy stopped stagnating: It nosedived. Access to food  became a severe problem. In January, the top leadership adopted a dramatic monetary and  exchange rate reform. Inadequate planning unleashed a remarkably high inflation rate, followed  by frequent policy “fixes” for specific problems, which contributed to renewed and ongoing  policy uncertainties. A frightening Covid-19 spike in June vaulted Cuba from one of the more  successful pandemic managers to one of the world’s worst-afflicted countries. As the very hot  Caribbean summer approached, in late June the electric power system broke down, propelling  people out of their homes. Too much time following the April 2021 Party Congress focused on  building new relationships and bonds of authority between the top leaders – career veterans but  new to being at the top – and intermediate Party and government ranks. Decision making  processes, never speedy, slowed. 

How did the nation’s leaders respond? The top leaders were surprised by, and  unprepared for, the July protests. Their initial response was confused and contradictory. Early  steps of conciliation and police restraint were followed by Special Troops and police repression  (beatings, arrests, summary trials) across the nation. Following explanations of practical

problems, especially by the prime minister, the official blame for the protests soon fell on  “outside agitators,” such as U.S. agencies and Cuban diaspora members. 

Following the July protests, which made significant use of social media, the government  also enacted new rules to criminalize actions through the Internet that may have an adverse  “impact on Cuba’s prestige,” criticize the content of the authoritarian Constitution, seek to  “compel public authorities to act or to fail to act” while performing their duties, or “damage the  reputation” of government officials. The 2019 Constitution promised improvements in its charter  of rights, but their implementation has been deferred, as these responses to the July protests  make clear.  

Moreover, the government has failed to make effective use of its own noncompetitive  national elections. For example, at the last national single-party election in 2018, three quarters  of the members of the Council of State would have been ineligible to serve on the Council if the  electoral law had required having been the top vote getter in a municipality; more than half  would have been ineligible to serve on the Council if the electoral law had mandated having  finished in the top half of vote receivers in their respective provinces. The government has not  made effective use of its own authoritarian-regime electoral law to promote its more popular  politicians into key national posts. 

Thus, can Cuba’s Communist Party undertake reforms beyond renewing and widening its  top leadership circles? Its most positive response following the July 2021 protests has been the  formal and final approval of reforms to permit the freer growth of small- and medium-sized  private sector businesses and cooperatives. Such reforms had been under consideration since the  Fall 2010! The leadership may need a “win” before it adopts wider reforms and does so more  quickly. The government chose to develop Cuba’s own vaccines against Covid-19. It claims to 

have succeeded with two, not yet approved by the World Health Organization and pending  independent peer review. Success with these vaccines could permit the reactivation of  international tourism, announced for mid-November 2021, even if not from the United States yet,  reactivating the economy while also addressing the public health crisis. With such new breathing  room, the pace of economic reform may accelerate. The near-term challenge is simpler. Do government and Party leaders believe their own  propaganda that the causes of the protests all lie outside the nation’s boundaries? Shakespeare’s  Cassius, in Julius Caesar (I:2, 145) provides good advice: “The fault, Dear Brutus, is not in our  stars, but in ourselves…” The fault, dear President Miguel Díaz-Canel, lies not in the U.S.  government or in southern Florida but in a leadership and policy regime in Cuba, both in  desperate need of bold and swifter change.

The Cuban Economy in a New Era – An Overview

Jorge I. Dominguez is an alumnus and longtime professor at Harvard University, where he most recently served as chair of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies. A successful writer and publisher, Jorge I. Dominguez is best known for his work in the areas of Latin America and Cuba that include “Social Policies and Decentralization in Cuba” and “The Cuban Economy in a New Era.”

Over 182 pages, The Cuban Economy in a New Era analyzes challenges and potential solutions as they relate to Cuba’s stagnant economy. The book, which includes commentary from professors Omar Everleny Perez Villanueva and Lorena Barberia, was published in 2018 by the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies and distributed by Harvard University Press.

The Cuban Economy in a New Era pinpoints a number of ills burdening the Cuban economy, ranging from a decaying infrastructure to stagnant agriculture and a bankrupt sugar industry. Moreover, the book explores policy changes that could lead to improvements in seven economic areas. These are new macroeconomic policy, private enterprise, non-agricultural cooperatives, central planning, private sector financing, state enterprise management, and relations with international financial institutions.

For additional information on The Cuban Economy in a New Era, visit

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